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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMMUNITY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING
COMMITTEES EXTENDED TO THE STATE COURTS-Petitioner Adams testified be-

fore a United States Senate Committee investigating crime. He freely confessed
conducting a gambling business in Maryland. The State of Maryland prosecuted
Adams and used that confession to convict him of conspiring to violate Maryland's
anti-lottery laws. Adams claimed immunity based on a federal statute, 18 U. S. C.
§3486, which states that no testimony given by a witness in Congressional investigations "shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in
any court. ...

."

The Maryland Court of Appeals held that this statute did not

apply in state courts and further held the immunity did not extend to testimony
voluntarily given. Adams v. State of Maryland, 97 A. 2d 281 (Md. 1953). The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to discover the full scope
of 18 U. S. C. §3486. The Supreme Court reversed the Maryland court by holding
that a witness need not claim the privilege against self-incrimination to be protected by 18 U. S. C. §3486, and that the statute applies to testimony freely given
and applies in any court, state as well as federal. Adams v. State of Maryland,
22 L. W. 4150 (U. S. 1954).
This case presented a question of first instance in the United States Supreme
Court.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, concerning selfincrimination, does not give a witness immunity against state prosecution, because
the Fifth Amendment applies only to the Federal Government. United States v.
Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931). There the Court stated:
This court has held that immunity against state prosecution is not essential
to the validity of federal statutes declaring that a witness shall not be excused
from giving evidence on the ground that it will incriminate him, and
also that the lack of state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute. The principle established is that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection
furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 149.
The statute in the Adams Case, supra, was similar to, and substantially the
same as the federal statute which preceded it, and which was construed in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). There the Court held that the

immunity granted must be absolute and coextensive with the privilege accorded
by the Fifth Amendment. In the instant case the Court would make the immunity
absolute for all criminal proceedings, state as well as federal. There is no necessity under 18 U. S. C. §3486 to claim the Fifth Amendment in order to be accorded the immunity. If you testify, you are immune. The full text of 18 U. S. C.

§3486 states:
No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before any committee of either House, or before any joint committee established by a
joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in any court, except in a
prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony. But an official
paper or record produced by him is not within the said privilege. (June
25, 1948, ch. 645, §1, 62 Star. 833, eff. Sept. 1, 1948.)
This statute was held to be the same as the statute set forth in Counselman v.
Hitchcock, supra, (28 U. S. C. §634), and further extends the immunity con-

cerned therein. United States v. Barksy, 72 F. Supp. 165 (D. D. C. 1947). Generally, Congress has granted a witness no more immunity than is necessary.
Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1912). At common law the immunity did
not extend beyond the jurisdiction. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)

§2252. The U. S. Constitution does not relieve a witness before a federal court
of the duty of testifying because he might thereby incriminate himself under
the law of some state. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 68, 69 (1906); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 597 (1896); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 382 (1905).
This is the same as the English rule of evidence which says that a witness is not
protected against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country.
Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330 (1861).
State immunity statutes have been held not to bar prosecution by the Federal
Government. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 (1944); Jack v. Kansas,
supra. Justice Holmes, in dicta, in Brown v. Walker, supra, expressed doubt
whether Congress could prescribe rules of proceeding for state courts, but that doubt
has proved groundless here. In Hale v. Henkel, supra, it was held that a witness
could not refuse to testify before a federal grand jury because the immunity
statute did not extend to prosecutions in a state court, and further held that in
granting immunity the only danger to be guarded against is one within the
same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignity. The Court went on to say
that all immunity statutes are constitutional as long as they are limited to the
jurisdiction of the sovereign.
The U. S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Murdock, supra, said full and
complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness
to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compulsory
self-incrimination. In Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 (1911), the
Supreme Court held that testimony can be compelled under the Bankruptcy Act
where complete immunity was given.
As to the subject matter of the testimony, it was stated in May v. United
States, 175 F. 2d 994, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 233 (1949), that only the testimony
and not the subject matter concerned in the investigation was privileged. The
Court went on to state that where a Congressman testified voluntarily he was not
protected by the statute because the testimony must be compelled. Thus the
Adams Case, supra, effectively overruled the case of May v. United States, supra.
In United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950), the Court stated that the
purpose of this immunity statute was to require the attendance of witnesses, full
response to all questions and the production of all pertinent records. There the
Court held that the failure of a witness to testify can be used against him in
subsequent criminal proceedings.
Two Federal District Court opinions have held that 18 U. S. C. §3486, does
not give the witness full protection and therefore he may plead the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination before a Congressional Committee. United States
v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D. D. C. 1951); United States v. Jaffe, 98 F.
Supp. 191 (D. D. C. 1951). Where a witness declined to answer and would not
claim the Fifth Amendment, the witness was not compelled to answer and a
prosecution brought against him was proper. United States v. DeLorenzo, 151 F.
2d 122 (2d Circ. 1945).
Congressional investigations are presumed to be proper and the Senate can
subpoena and enforce answers by contempt proceedings. McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U. S. 135 (1927). Since the purpose of Congressional inquiries is to aid
in enacting legitimate legislation, which is the supreme law of the land, Congress

can prescribe such immunity as it deems necessary. This is true even when
the law affects the rules of practice within state courts. Brown v. Walker, supra
at 606-608.
The purpose of the immunity statute is to prevent the introduction of
evidence into criminal proceedings which was obtained by inquisitorial, or at
least non-Courtroom methods. Therefore it is only proper that the immunity
apply to all witnesses, to all testimony, and in all courts.
JOHN

F.

HUGHES

COPYRIGHTS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Plaintiffs, manufacturers of electric
lamps, obtained copyrights on dancing-figure statuettes, pursuant to 17 U. S. C. A.
§ 5 (g), as being in the class of "Works of Art; models or designs for works of
art." Thereafter, the statuettes were embodied into lamp bases and were sold
throughout the country both as lamp bases and as statuettes. Without authorization,
the Defendants, also in the business of manufacturing and selling lamps, copied
the statuettes, embodied them in lamps and sold them.
Plaintiffs brought suit to recover damages for infringement. Defendants
challenged the validity of the copyrights, contending that although copyrighted
as "works of art", the statuettes, having been industrially reproduced as lamp
bases, were ineligible for copyright protection, but were within the scope of
design patents for "articles of manufacture."
The instant case is one in a series of suits presenting the same or similar
question which resulted in a diversity of decisions: the first action brought was
Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 96 F. Supp. 97 (N. D. Il1. 1951), where the court dismissed the complaint and held that statues which were intended solely to be
put to practical use were not copyrightable subject matter. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. 188 F. 2d 611 (7th Cir. 1951). In Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227
(S. D. Cal. 1952), the court held that sculptured statues were works of art which
were entitled to copyright protection against the defendants who copied the form
of the statues into lamp bases. This was affirmed on appeal. 205 F. 2d 633 (9th
Cir. 1953). In the principal case, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359 (D. Md. 1952). The Court of Appeals reversed
and held the copyrights valid. 204 F. 2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953).
To resolve the conflict in decisions, after several years of litigation, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 346 U. S. 811, and held: (1) the intended
use, or use of, an artistic work reproduced as a manufactured article does not invalidate its copyright, and (2) the patentability of the statuette does not preclude
its copyrightability as a work of art. Mazer v. Stein, 22 L. W. 4141 (March
8, 1954).
The Constitution of the United States invests Congress with the power "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times
to their authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries." Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. Pursuant thereto, Congress has provided
for two separate and distinct classes of protection, viz., the copyright, 17 U. S. C. A.
§§ 1 et seq., and the patent right, 35 U. S. C. A. §§ 101 et seq. Although similar
in some respects, Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (2d Cir. 1921),
there is no analogy between an author and an inventor within the meaning of
the two laws with respect to the originality of their productions. Baker v. Seldon,
101 U. S. 99 (1879). It is readily apparent from a comparison of the copyright

laws pertaining to "works of art" with those of the patent laws pertaining to
ornamental design for articles of manufacture that there are significant differences
between what is contemplated by these separate laws, Burrow-Giles Lithograph
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53 (1884); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co.,
139 F. 2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), notwithstanding that in Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.
2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1953), it was maintained:
The area in which a thing would be either a copyrightable work of art or a
patentable design .

.

. is perhaps unsurveyable.

Whether a thing is a work

of art or a patentable design cannot be determined by excluding one from
the other. .

.

. The two are not necessarily distinct one from the other.

There is a necessity, therefore, primarily, to distinguish between a design patent
and a copyright.
A design patent may be obtained by anyone who invents a "new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture." 35 U. S. C. A. § 171. The
length of protection is 3 , 7 or 14 years as the applicant may elect. 35 U. S. C. A.
§ 173. The purpose of the design patent law is to promote the decorative arts
and to stimulate the exercise of the inventive faculty by protecting an improvement in the appearance of the article of manufacture. Hueter v. Compco Corp.,
179 F. 2d 416 (7th Cir. 1950). As a pre-requisite for protection, the design
must be original, Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 199 F. 2d 99 (2d
Cir. 1951); and ornamental, Pelonge Scale Mfg. Co. v. American Cutlery Co., 102
F. 2d 916 (7th Cir. 1900). The exercise of inventive skill is also required. In
re Brooks, 110 F. 2d 686 (C. C. P. A. 1940); S. Dresner & Son, Inc. v. Doppelt,
120 F. 2d 50 (7th Cir. 1941). Although an object utilitarian in purpose and character is subject to patent protection, Baker v. Seldon, supra, the fact that the article
on which a design patent is sought has utility, neither precludes obtaining a design
patent thereon, nor a copyright. In re Montagne, 55 F. 2d 486 (C. C. P. A. 1932).
It is the peculiar or distinctive appearance of the design, "the aesthetic appeal to
the eye," which constitutes, mainly, the contribution to the public which the
law protects. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511 (1871).
A copyright, on the other hand, is the exclusive right granted an author to reproduce his writings for a limited time (28 years), 17 U. S. C. A. § 24, after
publication. Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U. S. 674 (1878). It is wholly statutory and
dependent on the right created under the law. Wheaton v. Peters & Griggs, 8 Pet.
591 (1834); Fox Film Corp v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932). The scope of the
copyright protection includes "all the writings of an author," 17 U. S. C. A. § 4.
But the copyright proprietor's right is limited to the right to make or use copies
of the protected material. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph Co., 188 U. S. 239
(1903). This protection is absolute and the copyrighted material cannot be
copied for any purpose without the consent of the holder of the copyright. Stein
v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227 (S. D. Cal. 1952); White-Smith Music Co. v.
Apollo, 209 U. S., 17 (1908).
There is a distinction between the common law right to intellectual productions and the statutory copyright, in that the former entitles the author to the
exclusive use of his unpublished works, 17 U. S. C. A. § 2; Holmes v. Hurst, 174
U. S. 82 (1899); whereas, the latter is the protection granted an author in his
works after publication. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912). The term
"publication" denotes a disclosure of the production to the public at which point
the common law copyright is lost, Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2331, and the statutory
copyright is acquired. Associated Press v. Internat. News Service, 245 Fed. 244
(2d Cir. 1917).

Unlike a patent giving the patentee "the right to exclude others from making,
using or selling the invention," 35 U. S. C. A. § 154, a copyright gives protection
only to the expression of the idea contained in the copyrighted work and prevents
others from copying the creation of the author. King Features Syndicate v.
Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924). To be copyrightable, a work must be
original, in that it owes its origin to the author, i. e., that the idea originated in
the mind of the author who gave it tangible expression. Dorsey v. Old Surety Life
Ins. Co., 98 F. 2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938). Since the purpose of the copyright law
is to protect authorship, the essence of the copyright shield is the protection of
originality rather than novelty or invention. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph Co.,
supra.It must not be solely utilitarian. Stein v. Rosenthal, supra. It is valid without
regard to the novelty of the subject matter. jewelers' CircularPub. Co. v. Keystone
Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
The appropriateness of copyright registration is determined by the artistic
character of the work of art as registered, and not by the ability or intent of the
applicant to use the work as the form of a utilitarian object. Stein v. Rosenthal,
supra. Copyrighting "works of art" or "designs of works of art" does not give to
the copyright registrant a monopoly on the article as an article of manufacture.
Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Hirsch, 34 F. 2d 291 (E. D. N. Y. 1929). Since an
article having both artistic and utilitarian qualities is copyrightable for its independent artistic value, the possession by that article of practical qualities does
not render it ineligible for copyright. In Mazer v. Stein, supra, the Court stated
that neither the copyright statute nor any other says that because a thing is
patentable, it may not also be copyrighted. To uphold the argument of the
Defendants in the Mazer Case, supra, "would require a judicial inquiry into the
mind of every copyright proprietor and determine his plans and intentions as of
the time of registration." It was never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution that the scope of the copyright law should be so limited. Rosenthal v.
Stein, 205 F. 2d 633 (9th Cir. 1953).
Nonetheless, difficulty arises in an attempt to determine definitely what constitutes "writings" and "authors" within the meaning of the Federal constitution.
The "writings" thus far separately classified under the copyright law include:
(a) books; (b) periodicals; (c) lectures; (d) dramatic compositions; (e) musical
compositions; (f) maps; (g) works of art; (h) reproductions of works of art;
(i) drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character; (j) photographs; (k) prints and pictorial illustrations; (1) motion-picture photoplays;
(m) motion pictures. 17 U. S. C. A. § 5. These specifications, however, do not
limit the subject matter of copyright which comprises "all the writings of an
author," as indicated in the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas:
The interests involved in the category of "works of art" as used in the copyright law are considerable. The Copyright Office has copyrighted: statuettes,
bookends, clocks, lamps, doorknockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers,
piggy banks, sun dials, salt shakers, fish bowls, casseroles and ash trays.
In addition, sculpture of the type protected by the Plaintiffs in the Mazer Case,
supra, has been recognized as "writings" also. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph
A. Freundlish, Inc., 73 F. 2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934). It is readily apparent that although the works mentioned might be "writings" in the constitutional sense,
they are obviously not "writings" in the popular sense. Since the Supreme Court
has never ruled precisely on the scope of either word, both are susceptible of
broad definitions.

The decision in the Mazer Case, supra, when added to the legislative history of
the copyright laws and the practice of the Copyright Office, reflects the philosophy
underlying copyright legislation-in order to encourage creative productions of
individuals which are of general benefit to the public, the Constitutional terms
are broad enough to authorize the copyright of a work which is the representation of the "intellectual conceptions" of an author at the time of registration,
notwithstanding its utilitarian potentiality.
ROSEMARIE SERINO

CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER-VIOLATION

OF MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTE

-Defendant was convicted of manslaughter for having caused a death while
violating a state motor vehicle law. The prosecution did not establish a conscious
nor reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others. The state statute did not
define the crime; consequently, the Supreme Court of Delaware based the conviction upon the common law definition of involuntary manslaughter. The defendant argued that there should be a distinction made between acts mala in se
and acts merely mala prohibita. The defendant further urged that the common
law requires more than ordinary negligence for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter and that the punishment was too harsh. The Court defined common law
involuntary manslaughter as "homicide committed unintentionally, but without
excuse, and not under such circumstances as to raise the implication of malice."
The Supreme Court of Delaware held that if a death results proximately from the
violation of a motor vehicle law, a conviction of common law involuntary manslaughter will be affirmed without any proof of conscious or reckless disregard of
the lives or safety of others. State v. Huph,
Del.
, 101 A. 2d 355 (1953).
Manslaughter, both voluntary and involuntary, is essentially a common law
crime. People v. Garman, 411 Ill. 279, 103 N. E. 2d 636 (1952). The common
law requires an act malum prohibitum to be accompanied by an added wantonness or recklessness to be the basis of involuntary manslaughter, while acts mala
in se suffice without further wrongdoing. State v. Horton, 139 N. C. 588, 51
S. E. 945 (1905).
Involuntary manslaughter is the causing of a death unintentionally and
without malice, but without excuse. It may arise from malfeasance, which is
a criminal act not amounting to a felony nor tending to great bodily harm.
State v. Barnett, 218 S. C. 415, 63 S. E. 2d 57 (1951); Middleton v. Commonwealth, 202 S. W. 2d 810 (Ky. 1947). The homicide is not excusable because it is
caused by a criminal act. State v. Beckman, 23 Iowa 154, 92 Am. Dec. 417 (1867).
Conviction of common law involuntary manslaughter depends upon the nature
of the criminal act. If the criminal act or violation is malum in se, a death from a
malfeasance may be the basis for a conviction of common law involuntary manslaughter. If the act is merely malum prohibitum, that alone will not suffice as
a basis for common law involuntary manslaughter, State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180,
91 P. 2d 457 (1939); State v. Horton, supra; Commonwealth v. Adams, 114
Mass. 323 (1873).
Crimes mala in se are those which are violations of the natural law, and the
common law punishes only that which is wrong in itself. These crimes are so
adjudged by the sense of a civilized community. They may be the bases of common law involuntary manslaughter convictions without proving malice aforethought, a felonious act, or a natural tendency to cause death. State v. Kellison,

233 Iowa 1274, 11 N. W. 2d 371 (1943). The act must be such as might
probably cause an unlawful consequence. People v. Garman, 411 Ill. 279, 103
N. E. 2d 636 (1952). One is criminally liable for acts occurring unintentionally
while he is in the execution of an intended act malum prohibitum or an unintended act malum in se. Thiede v. State, 106 Neb. 48, 182 N. W. 570 (1921).
Acts mala prohibita are determined, in this country, to be wrong by the
legislature, and if such acts result in an accidental death, there is no criminal
homicide. Commonwealth v. Adams, supra; State v. Budge, 126 Me. 233, 137
Atl. 244 (1927); State v. Horton, supra. Acts mala prohibita will not serve as
the bases of common law manslaughter without a showing of criminal negligence,
recklessness, or a disregard for the lives and safety of others. State v. Beckman,
219 Ind. 176, 37 N. E. 2d 531 (1941). A violation of a traffic statute, without
more, does not impose a criminal liability for a resulting death because the violation
is an act only malum prohibitum. An unintended or technical violation of a traffic
statute will not cause criminal liability for a death resulting proximately therefrom unless the violative act is accompanied by recklessness or is such that it is
likely to result in death. Hurt v. State, 184 Tenn. 608, 201 S. W. 2d 988 (1947);
State v. Barker, 196 P. 2d 723 (Utah 1948); Cain v. State, 55 Ga. App. 376, 190
S. E. 371 (1937); State v. Thomlinson, 209 Iowa 555, 228 N. W. 80 (1929).
A homicide must have a criminal intent to render the accused culpable of
manslaughter unless the resulting death is the natural or probable consequence
of 'the act. The law imputes a criminal intent to all acts mala in se. Keller v. State,
155 Tenn. 633, 299 S. W. 803 (1927); Thiede v. State, supra. Acts mala prohibita do not supply that intent, not even if the acts are violations of statutes.
The Thiede case, supra, held that if an act be malum prohibitum, effectuated
without a wrongful intent or reckless disregard for human safety, there is no
resulting criminal liability. Specific intent is immaterial if the death is caused
by criminal negligence in an act malum in se. State v. Long, 30 Del. 397, 108
Atl. 36 (1919). So also, if one knowingly engages in a criminal act of any
nature or evinces a reckless indifference to the safety of others, he is liable
criminally for a greater but unintended result. State v. Stanton, 37 Conn. 421
(1870); Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N. W. 972 (1911).
The majority of states today hold that punishable negligence must be more
than ordinary negligence; it must be gross, culpable, or reckless to be a basis for
a conviction of common law involuntary manslaughter. State v. Barnett, 63 S. E.
2d 57 (S. C. 1951); State v. Graft, 228 Iowa 159, 297 N. W. 97 (1940); Cutshall v. State, 191 Miss. 764, 4 So. 2d 289 (1941). An unintentional violation of
a traffic statute is not culpable negligence unless dangerous in itself. State v.
Lowery, 223 N. C. 598, 27 S. E. 2d 638 (1943); State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1194,
196 N. W. 82 (1923); Commonwealth v. Arone, 265 Mass. 128, 163 N. E. 758
(1928); State v. Lingman, supra. The violation of a traffic statute is only prima
facie evidence of negligence in a civil suit. White v. Saudner, 299 Ky. 269, 158
S. W. 2d 393 (1942). A minority of courts hold that such violations evince
negligence per se. See Willis v. Schlagenhauf, 188 Atl. 700 (Del. 1936).
An operator of an automobile voluntarily doing an improper act or refraining from doing a proper act, is not chargeable with involuntary manslaughter
unless he evinces a heedless disregard for the safety of others or takes the
chance of an accident occurring, even without an intent that it should occur.
Gross and culpable negligence or reckless indifference to life must be superimposed upon a charge of a statute violation malum prohibitum in order that

the criminal intent essential to manslaughter may be supplied. People v. Crego,
285 Ii. 451, 70 N. E. 2d 578 (1947).
Culpable negligence is gross and flagrant and evinces reckless disregard to
human life and consequences of the acts. Gross negligence itself does not
impute a wilful wrongdoing. It is higher than what is held to be gross negligence
in civil cases. Preston v. State, 56 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1952); State v. Homme, 32
N. W. 2d 151 (Minn. 1948); People v. Costa, 252 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1953). Wilful
and wanton misconduct differs from negligence per se both in kind and degree.
Murphy v. Snyder, 63 Ohio App. 423, 27 N. E. 2d 152 (1930). One acting in
violation of a positive statute and evincing a reckless disregard for the lives
of others commits acts that impute the criminal intent essential for a conviction
of involuntary manslaughter. Recklessness involves intentional conduct, although
the resulting harm may be unintentional. Dunnville v. State, 188 Ind. 373, 123
N. E. 689 (1919).
Involuntary manslaughter cannot be based upon a violation of a traffic statute
because the violation is only malum prohibitum. A traffic statute is a safety
statute, and a violation thereof is not criminal negligence unless the act is wilful
or accompanied by recklessness. The violation may be prima facie evidence of
negligence; however, negligence alone will not suffice as a basis for a conviction
of common law involuntary manslaughter. State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11
N. W. 2d 371 (1943); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 55 S. E. 2d 24
(1949).
The general trend today is to enact statutes to cope with automobile drivers
causing death. These statutes take the form of negligent homicide or reckless,
careless, or criminal negligence statutes. The District of Columbia, for example,
utilizes a negligent homicide statute, the elements for the conviction of which
are: the death of a human being by a motor vehicle operated at "an immoderate
rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not wilfully or
wantonly." 40 D. C. Code 606 (1951).
While granting that the States have the authority to change the common
law, it should be effected by virtue of statutes. It is an unwarranted extension
of a clear definition of common law involuntary manslaughter to hold that a violation of a statute may be the basis of common law manslaughter when the act
complained of is merely malum prohibitum. The Court in State v. Barnett, supra,
reflected the general preference today where, although forced by tenacious precedents to convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter for simple negligence,
stated that the punishment was too harsh and if the question were one of original
impression, they would not be in favor of adopting it. They recognized in that
opinion that the conviction was inadvisable but that the change should be effected
through the legislature. That is the proper course to follow and should have
been done in Delaware in the present case.
PATRICK J. FOLEY

FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT-ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN BROKERAGE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE STATUTORY SUIT FOR MISREPRESENTATION-Plaintiff sued to recover damages for misrepresentation in connection with the purchase of stock from defendants, partners in a securities brokerage firm. The suit
was brought under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15
U. S. C. §771 (2), which provides that the seller shall be liable to the purchaser

of a security which is sold by means of a prospectus or oral communication
which falsely states a material fact, or omits a material fact necessary to make
seller's statements not misleading. The purchaser may sue at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction. The parties had agreed to settle any controversy arising between them by arbitration in accordance with the United States
Arbitration Act. Defendant moved to stay the trial of the action pursuant to
section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, 9 U. S. C. §3, until
an arbitration in accordance with the agreement was had.
The question before the court was whether the agreement to arbitrate a
future controversy was a condition, stipulation, or provision within the meaning
of section 14 of the Securities Act, which provides that "any condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. §77n. The District Court denied
a stay of the proceedings on the ground that under the Securities Act a controversy between the parties was not referable to arbitration. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F.
Supp. 75 (S. D. N. Y. 1952). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that it was
unable to find, in the purpose or in the language of the Securities Act, any Congressional policy which would be strong enough to override the Congressional
policy of the Arbitration Act. 201 F. 2d 439 (2nd. Cir. 1953). The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the Court of Appeals holding that the plaintiff
would be deprived of the effectiveness of the remedies afforded by the Securities
Act if she were compelled to arbitration proceedings, and that therefore the
agreement to arbitrate was a waiver and as such void under section 14 of the Act.
Wilko v. Swan, 22 L. W. 4044 (U. S.1953).
The Securities Act was enacted to protect investors against fraud and malpractice in security transactions. In effect it substituted for the ancient rule of
caveat emptor the doctrine, "Let the seller beware." The burden of telling the truth
is on the seller. 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (March 29, 1933). The buyer is given a wide
choice of remedies for material misrepresentation or omission by the seller and
any agreement to waive the provisions of the Act is made void.
On the other hand, the law of most jurisdictions to-day shows a strong policy
in favor of arbitration as a substitute for litigation. It has been held that contracts containing clauses providing for settlements by arbitration are valid and
irrevocable, except on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of
any contract. General State Authority, to Use of Dunzik v. John McShain, 25 A.
2d 572 (Pa. 1942). In the United States Arbitration Act, Congress has evidenced
its approval of arbitration.
In effect, Wilko v. Swan, supra, presented the Court with two problems: (1)
Did the agreement to arbitrate in fact constitute a waiver of any provision of the
Securities Act? (2) Is there a conflict between the two Congressional policies
evidenced by the Securities Act and the Arbitration Act and, if so, which should prevail? The Court divided in its answer to these questions.
As the case required subjective findings of the purpose and knowledge of
an alleged violator of the Act, arbitration proceedings would be made without
explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings
which could not be examined. In order to assure plaintiff the effectiveness of
the Act, judicial direction would be required. The minority, in their opinion,
stated that "in the absence of any showing that settlement by arbitration would
jeopardize the rights of the plaintiff, the advantages of the Arbitration Act should
not be assumed to be denied in controversies arising under the Securities Act."

An analogous problem was presented by the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201, which allowed an employee who had not
been paid the minimum hourly wage or the overtime premiums required by the
Act to sue for double damages plus attorneys' fees. Although the Act was silent
on the point, in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 (1945), the
Court held that a release given for less than the full benefits afforded by the Act,
was not binding on the plaintiff. The Court, stating that the history of the Act
showed an intent on the part of Congress to protect the interest of certain groups
from sub-standard wages and excessive hours which endangered the national
health and welfare, held that such a statutory right, conferred on a private party
but affecting the public interest, could not be waived or released. This rule has
been modified by the Portal-to-PortalAct, 63 Stat. 910, 29 U. S. C. § 216(c), but
even under the amended statute, a waiver or release, to be valid, must have
been supervised by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contract
Divisions of the United States Department of Labor. See Harrel v. S. D. Bell
Dental Mfg. Co., 110 F. Supp. 538, (N. D. Ga. 1953).
There are a number of other Federal Statutes which contain express provisions relating to waiver or settlement of claims. Federal Employees' Liability Act,
45 U. S. C. §55; Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. §688 and Settlement of Wages Claims of
Merchant Seamen, 46 U. S. C. §§596, 644. The provisions of these Statutes have
been interpreted strictly by the Federal Courts so as to protect the employee
Garrett v. Moore McCormack Company, Inc., 317 U. S. 239 (1942); Henderson
v. Glen Falls Indemnity Company, 134 F. 2d 320 (1943); and Westenrider v.
United States, 134 F. 2d 772 (1943).
If the prohibition of waivers was intended to be limited to certain types of
proceedings, Congress could have so limited it. Since the prohibition is not
limited, it must be construed as being broad and general, and any agreement which
would defeat the purpose of the act would be a waiver within the section. The
ruling in the principal case indicates that where certain groups are put in a class
which is to be protected from fraudulent practices, the statute will be construed
so as to give the most benefit and protection to that class.
ALBERT B. MACKAREY

TORTS-ABSOLUTE LIABILITY-BLASTING-Plaintiffs brought this action to re-

cover for damage to their property caused by concussion and vibration resulting
from dynamite blasting. The blasting had been carried on by the Defendants
over a period of fifteen months in connection with grading operations for laying
railroad tracks. The Plaintiffs contended that the rule of absolute liability extends
to liability for damage caused by concussion from blasting and that it is sufficient to
prove that the blasting was the proximate cause of the damage.
The Supreme Court of Oregon found that the jury should decide whether
blasting was the proximate cause of the damage to the property and held that
blasting was an ultrahazardous activity and the one who engaged in it did so
at his peril. Bedell v. Goulter, 261 P. 2d 842 (Ore. 1953).
The underlying question is whether the courts should restrict a property
owner's use of his property so as not to injure his neighbor, or should the courts
adopt the principle which would permit the fullest use of his land? The
question of absolute liability has long been a judicial thorn in the side of English

and American law. The instant case is an adoption of the doctrine of absolute
liability in reference to property damaged by concussion and vibration resulting
from blasting with dynamite.
The doctrine of absolute liability was announced by Justice Blackburn in
Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 Exch. L.R. 265 (1866), and afterwards approved in
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), wherein it was held that a person
who brought anything of a dangerous nature upon his land acted at his peril
and was prima facie liable for all damages which were the natural consequences
of its escape. The courts have consistently held that, irrespective of negligence,
one engaged in a blasting operation is liable for damages to adjoining or neighboring property where there has been an actual physical invasion by stones or other
debris. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (1849); Asheville Constr. Co. v.
Southern R. Co., 19 F. 2d 32 (4th Cit. 1927).
The extension of the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, to encompass
cases where the damage resulted from vibration or concussion due to blasting,
had early opposition in this country. Booth v. Rome, 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592
(1893). At common law, one carrying on blasting operations was liable for all
direct damage, but the liability was not extended, in the absence of negligence,
to cases where damage was caused by concussion. Jinkins v. Tomasello, 286 Mass.
180, 189 N. E. 817 (1934). Such injuries were held to be consequential and
that blasting, without negligence, did not constitute a nuisance, trespass, or unreasonable use of land. Booth v. Rome, supra. The necessity of requiring proof
of negligence was based on the old difference between the actions of trespass
and trespass on the case. The former required no proof of negligence, while
the latter required proof of negligence, as well as substantial damages. Wendt v.
Yant Constr. Co., 125 Neb. 277, 249 N. W. 599 (1933). It has been contended
that only in rare instances does the law provide exception to the general rule
that fault is a necessary requisite to liability and that concussion cases are not
included as an exception, but are governed by the rule which requires an allegation and proof of negligence. Reynolds v. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A. 2d
802 (1950). The requirement of proof of negligence as a necessary element
of recovery was recently approved in Bennett v. Texas-Illinois Gas Pipeline Co.,
113 F. Supp. 788 (E. D. Ark. 1953). The court, in that case, based its decision
on the ruling in Holden v. Carmean, 178 Ark. 375, 10 S. W. 2d 865 (1928),
wherein the court stated that the highest degree of care must be exercised by
a user of dynamite in order to prevent injury to the property of others.
The reasoning of the courts of this country which require proof of negligence
where damage results from concussion was attacked at an early date as being
erroneous. The court in Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 Pac. 395 (1886)
stated that there was no material difference between damage to the plaintiffs'
dwelling caused by rocks and that caused by concussion. Blasting was said to be
an unusual and unnatural use of property. In Patrick v. Smith, 75 Wash. 407,
134 Pac. 1076 (1913), such distinctions were labeled as "illogical". One year
later, in the case of Johnson v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 182 Mo. App. 349,
170 S.W. 456 (1914), the court went so far as to declare that damage resulting
from concussion was a trespass. The court reached a similar result in Muskogee
v. Hancock, 58 Okla. 1, 158 Pac. 622 (1916), stating that there was as much
physical invasion by concussion as there was by rocks or other debris. Again in
Hickey v. McCabe and Bihler, 30 R.I. 346, 75 At. 404 (1910), the court, in rejecting the reasoning of Booth v. Rome, supra, denounced the distinction made
between damage caused by concussion and that caused by rocks.

In some cases, the doctrine of absolute liability has been limited to, and dependent upon, the locality wherein the blasting takes place. Blasting in a
sparsely settled country has been held to be a reasonable and justifiable use of
property, provided reasonable care was used. Cary Bros. v. Morrison, 129 F. 177
(8th Cir. 1904). Whereas, the use of dynamite in a populous city has been
held to be inherently dangerous. Chicago v. Murdock, 212 Il. 9, 72 N. E. 46
(1904). Blasting in populated surroundings or dwelling places has been held
to be an ultrahazardous activity in which the actor was liable regardless of the
exercise of due care. Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P. 2d 50 (1950).
In that case, the court pointed out that where blasting was done in remote places,
with little danger of damage, it would not be considered a nuisance per se and
would not be actionable without allegation and proof of negligence.
Some courts have limited the application of the doctrine of strict liability
for property damage caused by concussion from blasting to circumstances which
indicated that damage would have been the probable result of such blasting.
Accordingly, one engaged in the inherently dangerous operation of blasting,
where the property of another is necessarily or obviously exposed to danger,
was absolutely liable regardless of negligence. Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott Co.,
137 Conn. 562, 79 A. 2d 591 (1951). One who used the dangerous agency
of powerful explosives in such a way that the probable result thereof would have
been damage to property by concussion was liable, and proof of negligence was
not essential. Aycock v. Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co., 4 Tenn. App. 655 (1927).
A defendant in Ohio was held absolutely liable because of the proximity of the
blasting to adjoining land and the damage was the natural, necessary or probable
result of the force of the explosion. Louden v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106
N. E. 970 (1914).
In a few cases recovery for damage by concussion was permitted where
a nuisance could be established. Although blasting was not a nuisance per se,
where concussions were "continual" the court held that a nuisance could be
found as basis for applying the rule of absolute liability. Crino v. Campbell, 68
Ohio App. 391, 41 N. E. 2d 583 (1941). Where the court found that damage
caused by continual concussions was a "private nuisance", a similar result was
reached in Morgan v. Bowes, 17 N.Y.S. 22 (1891). Recovery was allowed without proof of negligence based on the theory that damage due to continual concussion was a nuisance. Dixon v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 293 N. Y. 509, 58 N. E.
2d 517 (1944).
One of the most important cases in the extension of the rule of absolute
liability to include property damage by concussion from blasting is Exner v.
Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F. 2d 510 (2nd Cir. 1931). In that case, dynamite
was held to be inherently dangerous, and the user became an insurer for damage resulting to others by concussion. The court based its decision upon the
"nature" of the agency involved and was not limited by secondary rules of
proximity, location, probability of damage, or negligence.
The tendency of courts today to base their decisions, supporting the rule
of absolute liability, upon the "intrinsically dangerous nature" of blasting operations is exhibited in Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott, supra. The more recent
decisions are firm in accepting the principle predicated upon the "ultra hazardous
nature" of the activity and upon the belief that the user acts at his peril and
assumes the risk. Fairfax Inn Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N. D.
W. Va. 1951).

The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §.519, 520, applies the doctrine of absolute
liability to damage caused by concussion from blasting. The liability of the user
is based on the ultra hazardous nature of the agency and the probability of injury.
Federoff v. Harrison Constr. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A. 2d 817 (1949).
The rule of absolute liability has not been accepted by all the jurisdictions
in this country. However, the cases reviewed by the writer indicate that the
weight of authority now lies in that direction. The principal case approves the
doctrine of absolute liability, first expressed in Rylands v. Fletcher,supra, basing its
holding upon the "ultrahazardous nature" of the activity. The inability to predict the severity of the explosion, coupled with the practical difficulty of proving
negligence, gives additional support to the application of the doctrine of absolute
liability, whereby the user of dynamite in blasting is held to be an insurer for
damage by concussion or vibration resulting from such blasting.
HARLAN

J. CHOATE

TORTS-MASTER AND SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-DUAL

PURPOSE

DOCTRINE-Action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U. S. C. A. §1346, for injuries sustained in an automobile collision with an
automobile driven by an employee of the U. S. Government.
An employee of the Corps of Engineers, located in Los Angeles, California,
had obtained permission to take several days annual leave in order to attend his
son's graduation in Glendale, Arizona. Prior to his departure, an urgent project
arose which necessitated the employee's traveling to Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
In order to serve both ends, he was authorized to take two days leave, to travel
by his own automobile, and he was given a per diem and traveling expense equal
to the cost of travel by train. His itinerary shows that January 30th and 31st
were charged to annual leave; he departed from Los Angeles on January 29th;
the accident occurred on January 30th.
Deciding specifically the issue of whether the employee was acting within
the scope of his employment, the Court held that no inquiry will be made as
to which business the servant was actually engaged in at the time the plaintiff
was injured, but the government is liable where it appears that the servant was
combining his own business with that of the master or attending to both at
substantially the same time. The case was then set for trial on the issue of
negligence. Marquardtv. U. S., 115 F. Supp. 160 (S. D. Calif. 1953).
This case is one of first impression in deciding that a government employee
is considered within the scope of his employment when he travels in his own
automobile and pursues a dual purpose, i. e., traveling to an official work assignment and at the same time traveling toward a personal destination en route. This
decision enlarges the scope of employment as applied in the Federal Courts to
such an extent that determination of the time, nature, intent of the employment
and the various other tests as applied by the courts would be unnecessary.
While no ratio decidendi is given for the principle, an applicable ratio may
be had from Young B. Smith's Frolic and Detour, 23 Col. L. Rev. 444 (1923),
which states that much of the confusion arising from the determination of what
is a complete departure from the line of employment or merely a slight deviation
may be avoided by looking to the underlying policies of respondeat superior
rather than the mechanical tests. The underlying policy is that it is socially more
expedient to spread the losses which are inevitable in industry over a large group
of the community than to cast the loss upon a few.

The origin of the principle set forth in the instant case can be traced through
California courts to the ruling as expounded in Brimberry v. Dudfield Lumber Co.,
183 Cal. 454, 191 Pac. 894 (1920), which cited as authority SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, ON NEGLIGENCE, Vol. I, § 147 (1888). The foundation, as noted in the
latter work, was Patten v. Rea, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 606, 140 Eng. Rep. 554 (1857)
which, however, was decided on the fact that the servant had the implied authority of the master to perform the particular act in question, and the rule as
such was not laid down.
As indicated, the doctrine of the principal case has been in effect for some
time. It has been applied to simple intermingling of purpose conflicts, U. S. v.
Johnson, 181 F. 2d 577 (9th Cir. 1950); and to deviation from the direct route
to serve personal ends. Wibye v. U. S., 191 F. 2d 181 (9th Cir. 1949). However,
in some state courts, as in Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 N. W. 2d 482
(1951), and Ryan v. Farrell,208 Cal. 200, 280 Pac. 945 (1929), its applicability
has been somewhat limited since those courts held that the right of control, of
which a significant factor is the existence of a mutual agreement controlling the
time, destination and purpose of the trip, determines whether the relationship of
master and servant exists; these cases then held the instant principle applicable
as determinant of the master's liability. The area of applicability of the doctrine
was again restricted to that mode of employment which necessitated travel by
its nature. McNew v. Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co., 37 Wash. 2d 495, 224 P.
2d 627 (1950).
The doctrine of no inquiry except the master's predetermined liability
when the dual purposes of master and servant are apparent in one transaction has
a limited jurisdictional acceptance, and, in fact, the contrary was held in U. S. v.
Eleazer, 177 F. 2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949). The facts being similar to the principal
case, the Court, however, decided that the officer was not within the scope of his
employment when he chose to drive his own car in traveling to his new duty
station, having been given deferred leave, instead of availing himself of commercial transportation. He was acting in furtherance of his own purpose, not that
of the government, and the mode of travel was for his own use and benefit and
subject to the control of no one but himself; therefore, the government was not
liable for the injuries sustained by a third person.
The Court in U. S. v. Eleazer, supra, quoted from the opinion of Judge
Walter H. Sanborn in the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 F. 681 (8th
Cir. 1907):
There can be no recovery of a person for the act or omission of his alleged

servant under the maxim 'respondeat superior', in the absence of the right
and power in the former to command or direct the latter in the performance
of the act or omission charged, because in such a case there is no superior
to respond.

Similarly, a soldier with a pass traveling in his own auto under orders to report
to his new station without being reimbursed for travel was not within the scope
of his employment when traveling, since the government had no control or direction over his movements. U. S. v. Sharpe, 189 F. 2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951).
To be within the scope of employment, the act must be done within the
space and time limits of the employment, and there must be an intent to perform
services for the master. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, §237. When the employee
is thus within the scope of his employment and engaged to some extent in his

master's business, it is immaterial that he may also have combined with this
some private purpose of his own. Thomas v. Slavens, 78 F. 2d 144 (8th Cir.
1935). The master's ends must actuate the servant to some appreciable extent.
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, §236. Should the servant do something incidental to
his employment when on a private venture, the master may be liable if the servant
would not have ventured for purely personal reasons. McNew v. Puget Sound Pulp
& Timber Co., supra. The result is otherwise when an employee uses his own car
for his own purpose and only by chance happens to do something incidental to
benefit the employer. Graffagnini v. George Engine Co., 45 So. 2d 412 (La.
1950).
The liability of the master extends to third persons injured by the servant
driving his own automobile within the scope of his employment when the use
of the instrumentality is either expressly or impliedly authorized by the master.
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Whitely, 116 F. 2d 871 (10th Cir. 1940). However, if an employee uses his own automobile for his own convenience when he
was not hired to drive, the employer is not liable. Gittleman v. Hoover Co., 337
Pa. 242, 10 A. 2d 411 (1940). But where the employer is merely interested
in the results and gives acquiescence to the travel of the employee by means of
his own automobile, in the absence of a right of direction, the employer would
not be liable for the negligent driving. Gosney v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 114 F. 2d 649 (8th Cir. 1940).
To determine whether a master is liable, various tests have been devised
by the courts. Judge Cardozo, in Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90, 167
N. E. 181 (1929), stated that if the work did not create the necessity for travel,
and if the journey had gone forward, though the business errand had been dropped,
but would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose, though the
business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk.
The employer's right and power to direct and control his imputed agent in the
performance of the casual act or omission at the very instant of the act or neglect
determines his liability. Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, supra. It must be proved
either that the master exercised control over the instrumentality, or the use of
the instrumentality at the time and place of the act complained of must be of
such vital importance in furthering the business of the master that the latter's
actual or potential control of it at the time and place may reasonably be inferred.
John Wesolowski v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 308 Pa. 117, 162 Atd. 166
(1932). Where the measure of control relates primarily to the contractual feature of the agent's employment and not to the physical details as to the manner
of performance of his movements, the master is not liable. Reiling v. Missouri
Ins. Co., 153 S. W. 2d 9 (Mo. 1941). The master should have control as to the
manner his agent drives his car. Hutchins v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
192 Atl. 498 (N.H. 1937). The California Court, in Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal.
2d 600, 145 P. 2d 1 (1944), held that the various factors to be considered in
determining liability are the intent of the employee, the nature, time and place of
his conduct, his actual and implied authority, the work he was hired to do, the
incidental acts that the employer should reasonably have expected would be
done, and the amount of freedom allowed the employee in performing his duties.
Mechem states that definite results, upon which everyone will agree, cannot be
expected since so much depends on the nature of the employment, the habits and
conduct of the parties, and other circumstances of the case. However, he criticizes

those courts that would not attempt to draw the line between the act of the
individual and that of the servant:
But certainly the mere difficulty of making a distinction which justice and
the rules of law approve, is no excuse for not attempting it; and the liability
of innocent masters for their servants, which has already been carried far
beyond the limits fixed by natural justice, ought not to be still further
extended merely because it may be difficult to draw the line. MECHEM,
LAW OF AGENCY, § 1887.

The instant case, in applying the principle of no investigation when the
dual purposes present themselves, has extended the scope of employment of government employees traveling under the guise of dual purpose so as to make
the government the indemnifier or insurer for the negligence of its employees, and
has bartered individual justice for easily determined results.
PAUL

J.

SIRWATKA

TRADE REGULATION-RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE-NON-SIGNER PROVISION OF FLORIDA FAIR TRADE LAw UNCONSTITUTIONAL-The Miles Laboraories, makers of Alka-Seltzer, brought a bill to enjoin the defendant, Eckerd's
Drug Store from selling below minimum prices as established under contracts
authorized by the Florida Fair Trade Law. Defendants were non-signers to an
agreement entered into between the Miles Company and others, establishing
minimum resale prices for plaintiff's product. The granting of defendant's motion
to dismiss was upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida.
The Court ruled unconstitutional the non-signer clause of the Florida Fair
Trade Act, Chapter 25204, Laws of 1949, reciting once again the long standing
hostility of the Florida courts toward fair trade. "This Court has expressed its
views on fair trade and unequivocally rejected, on constitutional grounds, both
the underlying theory and the economic facts on which they are sought to be
predicated." Judge Terrell stated further that the non-signer clause results only
in "anti-competitive price fixing", not in the protection of the good will of trade
marked products, and therefore such law is an invalid use of the police power
for a private purpose. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, Fla. -.
22
L. W. 2458 (1954).
The Miles decision did not mark the first time the Florida Supreme Court
has declared fair trade agreements unlawful insofar as they apply to non-signers.
A former fair trade law, Chapter 19201, Laws of 1939, provided for prosecution
of non-signers, since it bound them to sell at the set price whether the vendor
.was or was not a party to such a contract". This provision was held invalid

in Bristol Meyers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91
(1939). The Court held the non-signer clause as not within the scope of the
title of the Act which indicated that the Act applied only to retailers who
voluntarily entered into the contracts. Thus an attempt to bind a person who was
not a party to the contract was an invalid extension of the scope of the Act, since
under Florida law the title of the Act determines its scope.
Torn by judicial limitation, the fair trade standard stood for a decade enforceable only against signers to fair trade contracts. The final blow overthrowing
the complete statute came in Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.
2d 371 (Fla. 1949), where the law was held unconstitutional inasmuch as it
violated the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. The

Court further held the classification arbitrary and unreasonable, since those
persons who sold non-trademarked items could not avail themselves of the protection of the Act. It was also determined that this power to fix prices under the
fair trade law was a delegation of the sovereign power of the state to a private
person to be used for a private purpose and hence unconstitutional.
Following the 1947 upset of fair trade in Florida by judicial act, the legislature took up the cause once more. This time in order to secure the act against
further judicial attack, the legislature, in the repassage of fair trade legislation,
sought to circumvent judicial objections set out in the Continental Case, supra.
In the new Act, Chapter 25204, Laws of 1949, a preamble was written into the
fair trade law, entitled "Findings of Fact". This preamble stated most emphatically
that the fair trade law was in fact in the public interest, since price-cutting was
harmful to the general welfare. The Florida Legislature also added Section 10
to the Fair Trade Act, providing that the Attorney General might investigate
contracts of this class, and upon finding them to be against the purpose of the
Act, he was entitled to bring an action in the name of the state to enjoin compliance with the minimum price provision.
After the enactment of the 1949 Fair Trade Law, the Supreme Court of
Florida again took a critical view of the new Fair Trade Law in Seagrams Distillers v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235, (Fla. 1951). The Court said that the
"Findings of Fact" were not entitled to the customary presumption of correctness,
since they were mere conclusions, and were subject to judicial inquiry. However,
the invalidity of the non-signer provision in this case was governed by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), which held the non-signer provisions of state law
not exempt from the provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, 50 Star. 693
(1937), under the wording of the so-called Miller-Tydings Amendment of 1937,
which exempted "contracts or agreements" for minimum resale prices from the
provisions of the Sherman Act.
Originally resale price maintenance was forbidden under Section 1 of the
Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), which prohibited
contracts or agreements in restraint of trade. The Supreme Court judicially construed this section to prohibit resale price maintenance agreements. Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S.373 (1911). The MillerTydings Act of 1937, an Amendment to Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act, legalized
certain fair trade agreements and resolved the conflict between state and federal
laws on this question. The Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 was designed to remove
every obstacle which would hinder free enforcement by the states of their local
fair trade acts. However, this law, and the subsequent McGuire Act legalized contracts for minimum resale prices only insofar as the state laws so provided. Thus,
it was left up to the states to determine ultimately whether or not they would
have fair trade laws.
It was not until after the passage of the McGuire Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (a)
(2)-(6), 66 Stat. 632 (1952), which declared state non-signer provisions not
in conflict with the Sherman Act, that the Florida courts again found it necessary to reconsider the Fair Trade Law. This statute in effect revalidated the nonsigner provision declared unconstitutional in Seagrams Distillers v. Ben Green,
supra, because that decision was based on the technical ruling of the Schwegmann Case. Thus on March 15, 1954, the Florida Supreme Court once more struck
down the non-signer clause as an unconstitutional exercise of the police power.
Miles v.Eckerd, supra.

The Court in the Miles decision did not act as decisively against the Fair
Trade Law as it did when pronouncing the whole statute invalid in Liquor Store
v. Continental Distilling Co., supra. However, the Court, in dicta, cited with
approval its Continental decision and stated that the Fair Trade Act in question
was substantially identical with the former Act inasmuch as nothing material had
been added except the findings of fact and the provision for an injunction by the
Attorney General, leaving the law in no better shape than it had been before.
The distinction between the situation prevailing after the Continental Case,
supra, and the situation today lies in the fact that in the period after the Continental decision all "fair trading" was illegal, while the Miles decision leaves "contracts and agreements" for resale price maintenance valid, but non-signers are
free to determine price themselves.
The constitutionality of fair trade statutes in California and Illinois, which
were similar to the one struck down in the Miles Case, supra, were sustained
against arguments of denial of equal protection of the laws, lack of due process,
delegation of price fixing power to private persons, and ambiguity of the term
"fair and open competition." Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers
Corp., and Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 299 U. S. 183 (1936); Pep Boys v. Pyrol
Sales Co., Inc., and Kunsman v. Factor & Co., 299 U. S. 198 (1936).
With the decisions in these cases, and the green light given by the MillerTydings Act, all states passed fair trade laws except Vermont, Missouri, Texas,
and the District of Columbia. These state fair trade laws have been upheld almost universally in the state courts in a chain of decisions extending over the past
twenty years. Thus Florida, in the decisions of Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., supra, and Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd, supra, has definitely set up
a minority rule.
The antipathy of the Florida courts toward fair trade might claim to draw
at least token support from some recent decisions in other states. The Supreme
Court of Michigan ruled the fair trade law of that state invalid in Shakespeare Co.
v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N. W. 2d 268
(1952). The Court based its decision in great part on the Schwegmann Case,
supra, but the Court explicitly adopted the Florida rule of Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., supra,calling it the better reasoned view, meanwhile stating
that fair trade was an invalid exercise of the police power since it bears no
reasonable relation to the general welfare.
The Georgia Supreme Court struck down the fair trade law of that state
in Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S. E. 2d 161
(1953). There, however, the Court was not concerned with the police power
argument, but held the Act invalid because at the time of its passage in 1937
it was inconsistent with the Sherman Act, and thus offended the supremacy clause
as well as the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. It was, therefore, void
ab initio. But subsequently the Georgia legislature passed an act revalidating fair
trade in that state which became effective on January 6, 1954.
Also declared invalid was the non-signer provision of the Minnesota Act, in
Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Sachs, 234 Minn. 303, 48 N. W. 2d 531 (1951), but
again, the reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., supra.
The Court of Appeals held the non-signer provision of the New York
fair trade act unconstitutional in Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc. v. Macy & Co.
269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936), but the Court reversed itself and held

the Act constitutional in Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman. 273 N. Y. 267, 7
N. E. 2d 30 (1937).
The District Courts in Arkansas and Nebraska within the last few months
have delivered opinions holding the fair trade acts of these states invalid, but
final determination of the question will have to be made by the state supreme
court in each case.
THoMAs E. O'NEILL

